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ABSTRACT
With increasing proportion of windpower, an important concern is that of maintaining the
reliability of the electric grid in the face of higher supply-side volatility. In this paper,
we examine the role of risk-based penalties in developing alternate designs in which firms
combine energy bids associated with uncertain real-time availability with stable reserves
bids. Such a study is carried out in a regime where firms have access to a day-ahead
market, an uncertain real-time energy market and a reserves market. The resulting game-
theoretic problem is a two-period stochastic Nash game with risk-based objectives and the
associated equilibrium conditions are given by a complementarity problem. Preliminary
numerical results on a 6-firm problem provide insights regarding the impact of reserves and
risk penalties on wind-based generation, particularly in the face of high variability.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Renewable portfolio standards represent a set of regulations that require increased produc-
tion of energy from renewables such as windpower, solar, biomass, and geothermal. More
specifically, such requirements mandate that electricity supply companies produce a pre-
scribed fraction of their supply from renewables. Yet, such an impetus comes with a crucial
challenge: extant market designs are not well equipped to manage the volatility and inter-
mittency of renewables. In particular, when firms with renewables place a day-ahead bid
that is significant with respect to their expected availability, system operators allocate re-
serves. If a firm is unable to deliver in the real-time markets, certain designs provide for a
deviation penalty while other designs might impose a modest charge, if at all, in an effort
to provide incentives for renewables. Regardless, the system operator has to bring forth
reserves, the cost of which may be partially met by such penalties. In effect, current designs
remain ill-equipped to price reliability, particularly in a high penetration regime.
A key shortcoming in current designs is the inability to manage the risk imposed by firms
with volatile assets. In this thesis, we present a two-fold market-based approach for manag-
ing reliability that relies on imposing risk penalties on firms that impose a reliability-based
risk on the market and providing firms with the access to package their inherently volatile
energy bids with stable reserves contracts. Through such a design, after the day-ahead mar-
ket, an ex-ante measurement of the supply-side shortfall risk is available. Further, the onus
of meeting such shortfall is moved to the responsible firms rather than being under the ambit
of the system operator.
Before proceeding to review some aspects of market design and pricing, we provide a brief
review of regulatory changes in the power sector. Early efforts at deregulation in the power
sector were observed in Chile, England and New Zealand in the early 90s [GN92,CH98] while
in the the United States, the states/control areas of California, New England, Pennsylvania-
New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) interchange and New York followed suit in the late 90s. As-
certaining the efficacy of market designs has always been a challenge, given their inherent
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complexity [SCTB88,W.R02]. Since, the late 90s, equilibrium models have assumed an im-
portant role in examining the strategic behavior of firms within the oligopolistic structure
prevalent in such markets [B.F86,CHH97]. These models originate from game-theoretic mod-
els [FT91, OR94, vNM07] while the Nash solution concept was introduced in 1950 [Nas50].
More recently, the multiple settlement structure and uncertainty have made these models
large and complex [SIG11,KSK11,KO04,JIS08].
Pricing of power is a result of a set of clearings, often referred to as settlements. Such a
clearing is a consequence of the firms submitting offers which are subsequently employed by
the system operator in solving a unit commitment problem and an economic dispatch prob-
lem. The resulting Lagrange multiplers associated with the nodal supply-demand constraint
provide the locational marginal (energy) prices (LMPs). A single settlement framework refers
to a clearing wherein the firms bid in the real time market [Hob01, HJS07, MHP03] while
two (or multiple) settlement markets are characterized by the successive bidding by firms
in the forward/day ahead market and the real-time market [CHH97,HMP00,HR06,JIS08].
In such a regime, firms are paid the day-ahead price for their day-ahead bids (promised
generation levels) while deviations seen in the real time market are compensated at the
real time price. Such games may be analyzed under different rationality assumptions. For
instance, a fully rational model would lead to a game where agents compete in the first
period market subject to real-time market equilibrium, leading to a rather difficult class of
equilibrium problems. These games are often classified as multi-leader multi-follower games
and the associated equilibrium problems are referred to as equilibrium program with equi-
librium constraints or EPECs. In such games, each agent solves an mathematical program
with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) [JSI07,JIS08,SIG11]. A bounded rationality approach
requires that certain strategies, while rational, may not be computable; this has led to the
development of a boundedly rational framework in which such strategies are excluded. More
recently, boundedly rational models have been introduced wherein firms submit forward or
day-ahead and spot-market bids associated with every realization of uncertainty. This leads
to a variational or complementarity formulation [MHP03,HJS07,KSK0], thereby leading to
more tractable problems.
Most power markets clear the energy market in an effort to meet system demand and the re-
serves market to ensure the satisfaction of the reserve margin. Co-optimized energy-reserves
market are designed to jointly clear the energy and reserves markets in a least-cost fashion
(cf. [WSZ+13b,WSZ+13a,WSZ+11,ZL06]). A joint clearing mechanism is motivated by the
observation that these markets are inherently coupled and a sequential coupling tends to ig-
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nore such a relationship. There has been a significant amount of research that has examined
such designs from the ISO’s standpoint. In [ERFF09], Ehsani et al. consider a risk-based
design that ensures the provision of sufficient reserves to maintain system reliability in which
reserves sales are compensated in accordance with their loss in energy sales. An analogous
framework is also considered by Yun and Kirschen [YD06] where generating firms providing
reserves are paid at least the opportunity cost incurred. A key characteristic of such mod-
els is the design of the reserve pricing framework. Zheng and Litvinov [ZL06] consider an
ex-post pricing model in which energy and reserves prices are computed sequentially; the
ex-post energy prices are first determined by using the ex-ante marginal opportunity costs
of reserves while ex-post reserves prices are subsequently determined by using the ex-post
opportunity cost of energy, which depends on the ex-post energy prices.
Managing the reserves margin effectively gains increasing relevance as supply-side volatil-
ity grows, a consequence of integrating renewables. The impact of increasing levels of wind-
power on strategic behavior has seen relatively limited examination. While there has been
a fair amount of research on the usage of risk measures in day-ahead markets [CNAGB08,
CNCM02], this discussion is confined to hedging risk in energy-only markets where no re-
serves are present. In [KSK11], the authors employ a two-period stochastic model where
firms make simultaneous day-ahead and real-time decisions for every realization of uncer-
tainty. An extension of this model is presented in [KSK0], where risk-based penalties are
introduced to capture the risk arising from the supply-side volatility. Here, the focus was
largely on examining whether ex-ante penalties provide an alternative to standard ex-post
deviation costs that are standard in most designs. Furthermore, when employing such penal-
ties, the authors examined the impact of increasing supply-side volatility on forward market
participation and expected profits. The current work extends this framework to allow for a
co-optimized energy-reserves market where firms can package their energy and reserves bid
and reserves are entirely managed through the market participants. We now provide a more
definitive motivation for considering the problem of interest.
1.1 Motivation
As mentioned earlier, shortfall risk is inherent to markets aggregated around firms with
uncertain generation assets. Such risk could be mitigated by introducing reserves into the
market; however, wind firms currently have no incentives in the current market design to
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purchase reserves. In fact, wind firms may make aggressive bids even when they have access
to relatively accurate wind forecasts. Consider the next set of examples drawn from the
the Texas power market (ERCOT). Figure 1.1 shows such an instance where the day-ahead
resource plan did not successfully forecast the degree of shortfalls of the actual wind output
shown in orange. However, the 80% of the wind forecast did predict the wind output with
good accuracy.
Figure 1.1: Feb. 26, 2008 (ERCOT)
Figure 1.2 shows that the updated resource plan for wind shown in red is still showing a
great deviation from the actual wind energy output. It is worth noting that despite high
accuracy in the wind forecast, wind generating firms constantly make aggressive bids in the
day-ahead market, creating a shortage in the real-time market. This is an obvious loss to the
market but the current market design lacks a systematic way of sharing the responsibility of
grid reliability at the firm level. Hence, it is our intention to introduce a risk-based penalty
which will charge wind firms based on the level of shortfall in the real-time market. This
will provide sufficient incentives for wind firms to purchase reserves and increase availability
in the real-time market.
The addition of reserves into the market introduces several challenges. While there is
no requirement for firms to buy reserves, we believe that a risk-based penalty may provide
an economic incentive towards providing more reliable power. Specifically, if a firm places
4
Figure 1.2: Feb. 26, 2008 (ERCOT)
a bid that is fraught with the risk of shortfall in the real-time, a risk charge is applied.
This charge may be reduced by making a reserves bid, an avenue that is available to firms
operating co-optimized markets. As a consequence, our focus is on examining the role of
such incentives (penalties) in mitigating volatility of supply in real-time markets. This
article intends to develop a framework for analyzing the following question: In co-optimized
markets with strategic firms with volatile generation assets, do risk-based penalties provide a
motivation to package (volatile) generation bids with (stable) reserves bids? We contend that
such risk penalties, if successful, will penalize, and therefore exclude, the riskier strategies
as equilibria. Furthermore, this may lead to developing market designs that introduce such
incentives and are characterized by bidding behavior defined by higher system reliability and
lower volatility.
1.2 Description of model
We present a model in which firms are charged a risk-based penalty that captures the system-
level cost of accommodating the possibility of shortfall in the real-time market. When faced
with such a penalty, firms may choose to concomitantly place a reserves bid to mitigate such
a charge. In effect, the responsibility for shortfall is now borne partially by the suppliers.
The traditional structure of most markets requires firms to make block bids, that are sub-
sequently employed by the independent system operator (ISO) to determine dispatch levels
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and prices. Modeling this accurately requires allowing agents to bid with supply curves,
leading to rather challenging supply-function equilibrium problems [AP02]. In the simplest
of settings, these problems are far less tractable and lead to infinite-dimensional variational
problems. An oft-used scheme has been to employ a Nash-Cournot framework in which
participants compete in quantity [Hob01, MHP03] where the resulting variational problems
are somewhat more tractable.
We consider a two-settlement setting where firms compete in the day-ahead and an un-
certain real-time market. More formally, our framework comprises of the following:
• Competitive models for energy and reserves pricing: We present two distinct pricing
models for energy, the first being a perfectly competitive regime with exogenously spec-
ified and uncertain real-time demand, while the second is an imperfectly competitive
Nash-Cournot regime with endogenously specified real-time demand. Day-ahead re-
serves contracts are priced through the sensitivities associated with the supply-demand
constraint.
• Stochastic two-settlement markets: We allow agents to place day-ahead energy and
reserves bids and recourse-based real-time bids simultaneously. Uncertainty in the
real-time market takes the form of stochastic costs, availability, and price functions
(in the context of Nash-Cournot pricing for energy). Consequently, any reserves bid
will provide an incremental capacity that an agent can make avail of in the real-time
market, if necessary.
• Risk-based penalties: Risk-based penalties are imposed on every firm in correspondence
with the risk associated with shortfall in the real-time market. Such a penalty is
mitigated by purchasing reserves, lower day-ahead bids, and lower volatilities. This
metric can then be used to provide incentives to the firms to package bids to minimize
their mean-risk objective.
Together, these three layers of complexity are jointly captured within a risk-based stochas-
tic equilibrium problem. An equilibrium of such a problem would be a set of bids in the
day-ahead market in the energy/reserves market as well as set of scenario-specific generation
decisions in the energy-market.
1.3 Contributions
This thesis makes the following contributions:
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(i) Models: The first contribution lies in the modeling of a two-settlement energy-reserves
market under uncertainty where firms make reserves and energy bids in the day-ahead
market and recourse bids in the real-time market. We consider two different models
for energy pricing: in the first, we employ a a stochastic perfectly competitive equilib-
rium model (SPCE) in which uncertain real-time demand is exogenously defined while
in the second, a stochastic imperfectly competitive Nash-Cournot equilibrium model
(SNCE) is prescribed where demand is specified endogenously. Reserves are priced
through the sensitivity of the buy-sell reserves constraint. Finally, a conditional value-
at-risk (CVaR) penalty is imposed in an effort to ensure that every firm is charged in
accordance with the shortfall risk imposed on the grid.
(ii) Analysis: We examine the equilibria associated with the stochastic perfectly compet-
itive model and its imperfectly competitive variant. This requires us to show the
equivalence between these problems and suitably defined stochastic convex optimiza-
tion problems by analyzing the equilibrium conditions of (SPCE) and (SNCE). We
proceed to show that these problems are solvable.
(iii) Insights: Lastly, we perform numerical analysis on the impact of introducing a risk
measure and reserves bids on the bidding behavior as well as on the reliability of the
market.
1.4 Outline
Including the introduction, this thesis is comprised of five sections. In Chapter 2, we describe
a two-stage perfectly competitive model as well as a variant in which the energy is priced via
a imperfectly competitive Nash-Cournot model. In Chapter 3, via an equivalence statement,
we analyze the equilibria of the problems presented in Chapter 2. In Chapter 4, we present
numerical insights drawn from a six-firm two-settlement model and conclude the thesis with
a short set of remarks in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2
STOCHASTIC CO-OPTIMIZED
ENERGY-RESERVES MARKETS
In this section, we present two models for co-optimized energy-reserves markets. In Section
2.1, we introduce a perfectly competitive energy market in which uncertain real-time en-
ergy demand is exogenously specified while reserves are priced endogenously in accordance
with the supply-demand reserves requirement. An imperfectly competitive regime for energy
pricing is considered in Section 2.2, where the pricing of energy is derived through an imper-
fectly competitive Nash-Cournot model. In each instance, firms make day-ahead energy and
reserves bids while taking recourse in the real-time market in the face of uncertainty, which
may arise from generation capacity and demand.
2.1 Perfectly competitive models
Consider a two-period energy and reserves market with N firms in which the second period is
partitioned into T subperiods. Specifically, the first period represents the day-ahead market
while the collection of T sub-periods corresponds to the real-time market. For purposes of
simplicity, we consider a single-node model with the intent of extending it to the networked
regime in future work.
Suppose the aggregate day-ahead bid is denoted by Qj ,
∑N
i=1 qij, where qij denotes
the day-ahead bid of the ith firm associated with period j in the real-time market. Fur-
thermore, suppose the aggregate output in the real-time market associated with scenario ω
during period j is denoted by Qωj ,
∑N
i=1 q
ω
ij, where q
ω
ij denotes firm i’s real-time generation
in period j under scenario ω ∈ Ω. Note that Ω is the set of sample-space. Furthermore,
let P denote the associated probability measure and E[•] the associated expectation operator.
Generator i’s cost of generation in period j in the real-time market under scenario ω is
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given by the following convex quadratic function
cωij(q
ω
ij) :=
1
2
aωij(q
ω
ij)
2 + bωijq
ω
ij, (2.1)
where (aωij, b
ω
ij) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω and qωij is the real-time generation by firm i. The real-time
generation is related to its day-ahead bid by the conservation constraint:
qωij = qij + u
ω
ij − vωij. (2.2)
Note that uωij and v
ω
ij denote positive and negative deviation levels from day-ahead levels,
both of which are constrained as being nonnegative. As we discussed earlier, the system
operator could impose a deviation cost for any deviation between the real-time generation
and the day-ahead energy bids. Specifically, firm i’s deviation cost in period j with scenario
ω is given by the following quadratic function:
δωij(u
ω
ij − vωij) :=
1
2
gωij(u
ω
ij − vωij)2 + hωij, (2.3)
where (gωij, h
ω
ij) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. Similarly, the ramping cost for firm i in period j under
scenario ω is given by
ξωij(q
ω
ij+1 − qωij) :=
1
2
wωij(q
ω
ij+1 − qωij)2 + zωij, (2.4)
where (wωij, z
ω
ij) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. For j = 1, . . . , T , the ith generator may choose to sell sij
units for i ∈ N cw or buy rij units of reserves for i ∈ Nw in the reserves market, where Nw
denotes the collection of firms selling wind and N cw, the associated complement set. As a
consequence, for i = 1, . . . , N and for j = 1, . . . , T , the ith firm’s availability in sub-period
j of the real-time under scenario ω, denoted by Capωij, is augmented by the net reserves
purchased and this leads to a corresponding modification of the capacity constraint:
qωij ≤ Capωij − sij + rij, ∀ω ∈ Ω. (2.5)
Next, we consider a modified market design under which a risk-based penalty is charged to
the generator based on the likelihood of being short in the real-time market. More specifically,
the ith generator faces a penalty given by φij(qij − rij + sij; Capωij) based on qij − rij + sij.
This penalty captures the likelihood of shortfall in the real-time market. For instance,
suppose Xωi is a random variable with a (truncated) normal distribution with mean 100
and standard deviation 20. Then qij − rij + sij = 300 implies a high likelihood of shortfall
since the probability that availability exceeds 300 is relatively small. Correspondingly, if
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qij + sij − rij = 20 would be charged a modest risk penalty. Note that if qij + sij − rij = 300,
then by an increase in the purchase of reserves rij by ∆ would lead to a risk penalty given by
φij(qij−rij +sij−∆; Capωij); Since this penalty is an increasing function of its argument, this
would lead to a lower penalty. If χij > 0 and τij ∈ (0, 1) for all i = 1, . . . , N and j = 1, . . . , T ,
then a conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) measure is given by
φij(qij − rij + sij; Capωij) , min
mij
Fij(qij, rij, sij,mij), (2.6)
where Fij is defined as follows:
Fij(qij, rij, sij,mij) ,
[
mij +
1
1− τijE
[
χi(qij − rij + sij − Capωij)+ −mij
]+]
. (2.7)
Succinctly, the ith generator is faced by a two-period problem:
• Day-ahead market (Period 0): Here the generator makes a day-ahead energy and
reserves bid that could either necessitate buying or selling reserves;
• Real-time market (Periods 1, . . . , T ): In each sub-period in the real-time market,
the generator specifies his generation level based on available generation and reserves
contracted from the day-ahead for each realization of uncertainty.
In an effort to reduce system-wide volatility, firms that sell energy generated from inherently
volatile sources (particularly wind) may purchase reserves from the reserves market, sold by
energy providers that have stable resources (nuclear, coal, etc.). Simultaneous deviation bids
are made in the real-time market to accommodate a variety of contingencies ranging from a
shortfall to excess capacity, to unforeseen structural variations.
Next, we consider the pricing of energy and reserves. A fairly common approach in the
face of exogenous demand likes in using a perfectly competitive models for energy pricing
(cf. [HH04]). Pricing of reserves has been less studied but the few studies have taken on
a far more intricate route that has focused on ex-post opportunity cost pricing methods
(cf. [ZL06]). We consider a somewhat simpler mechanism ex-ante pricing mechanism that
employs the sensitivity of the supply-demand constraint. Both the reserves and the real-time
prices are determined via a competitive market in which the price is the Lagrange multiplier
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of the market clearing conditions specified by the following:∑
i
qωij = d
ω
j , (ρ
ωpωj ) j = 1, . . . , T,∑
i∈N cw
sij =
∑
i∈Nw
ri, (p
r
j) j = 1, . . . , T,
where pωj denotes the real-time price in period j under scenario ω and p
r
j denotes the reserves
price. The net revenue from generation during sub-period j is given by
pjqij + E[pωj qωij − pjqij] = pjqij + E[pωj (qij + uωij − vωij)− pjqij]
= pjqij + E[pωj (uωij − vωij)],
where the first equality arises from the definition of qωij and the second equality is a conse-
quence of imposing the no-arbitrage assumption specifying that the day-ahead price is the
expected real-time price or pj = E[pωj ] for j = 1, . . . , T . The net revenue is given by the incre-
mental revenue/loss from generating either above or below the day-ahead level. Therefore,
the expected profit for a firm i is given by
piij(rij , sij , qij , q
ω
ij , u
ω
ij , v
ω
ij) ,
T∑
j=1
prj (sij − rij) (Reserves revenue)
+
T∑
j=1
E
[
pωj q
ω
ij − cωij(qωi )
]
(Generation revenue-cost)
−
T∑
j=1
κij
(
φij(qij − rij + sij ; Capωij)
)
(Risk of shortfall)
−
T−1∑
j=1
E[ξωij(q
ω
ij+1 − qωij)] (Cost of ramping)
−
T∑
j=1
E[δωij(u
ω
ij − vωij)]. (Cost of deviation),
(2.8)
where δωij, ξ
ω
ij and φij are defined in (2.3), (2.4) and (2.6), respectively. Despite the presence
of a risk measure in the objective function, we still need to impose deviation costs because
deviation costs and the risk-measure serve two different purposes. Specifically, a deviation
cost function ensures that day-ahead quantity bids are not too far off from the real-time
generation and discourage the presence of purely financial players. The risk measure provides
a (negative) incentive to wind firms to purchase reserves bids which in turn aid in reducing
the risk of shortfall. Naturally, deviation costs can also contribute towards this objective
but such costs are inherently ex-post and do not provide an ex-ante understanding of the
risk imposed, unlike the risk-based metrics. The resulting firm i’s maximization problem in
11
period j is given by the following problem:
(PCFirmi(p
r
j , p
ω
j )) max piij(rij , sij , qij , q
ω
ij , u
ω
ij , v
ω
ij)
subject to
qωij − rij + sij ≤ Capωij , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
qωij+1 − qωij ≤ qUi , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T − 1
qωij − qωij+1 ≤ −qLi , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T − 1
qωij − qij − uωij + vωij = 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
qij , rij , sij ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , T
qωij , u
ω
ij , v
ω
ij ≥ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
rij ≤ 0, if i ∈ N cw, j = 1, . . . , T
sij ≤ 0, if i ∈ Nw, j = 1, . . . , T
(2.9)
where qUij and q
L
ij denote the upper and lower ramp, respectively. The stochastic perfectly
competitive equilibrium problem is given by the following set of systems:
(SPCE)
(rij, sij, qij, q
ω
ij, u
ω
ij, v
ω
ij) solves (PCFirmi(p
r
j , p
ω
j )), j = 1, . . . , T
N∑
i=1
qωij = d
ω
j , (ρ
ωpωj ) ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T∑
i∈N cw
sij =
∑
i∈Nw
ri, (p
r
j) j = 1, . . . , T.
(2.10)
The perfectly competitive problem, denoted by (SPCE), displays several crucial differ-
ences with standard perfectly competitive equilibrium problems. First, the firm problems
are coupled through their constraints by a shared constraint. Second, the set of equilibrium
conditions emerging from the firm problems are constrained by two sets of constraints, the
first being the supply-demand constraint for energy, and the second being the buy-sell con-
straint for reserves. Shared-constraint Nash games have been studied extensively over the last
decade and represent a special case of the generalized Nash game (cf. [FAV07,FC07]). The
additional constraints render this a constrained equilibrium problem, a class of problems that
has seen relatively less study [KS09]. A significant proportion of study of shared-constraint
Nash games has considered the study of the variational equilibrium (VE) which corresponds
to equilibria in which the multiplier associated with the shared constraint is common across
firms. To be more precise, the multipliers corresponding to the shared constraints are dis-
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played as follows and are not subscripted by the firm index i:∑
i∈N cw
sij ≤ η
∑
i∈N cw
Capωij, (ρ
ωζωj ) ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T (2.11)
N∑
i=1
qωij ≥ β
N∑
i=1
qij. (ρ
ωγωj ) ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T. (2.12)
We focus on precisely such an equilibrium in this thesis. It can be shown with relative
ease that under suitable convexity assumptions on the firm’s cost function that a variational
equilibrium of (SPCE) is given by a solution to the following stochastic convex optimization
problem ( Prop. 2 in Section 3.1):
(SPCOPT) min
N∑
i=1
T∑
j=1
[
E
[
cωij(q
ω
ij)
]
+ E[δωij(uωij − vωij)] + κijφij(qij + rij − sij ; Capωij)
]
+
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
j=1
E
[
ξωij(q
ω
ij+1 − qωij)
]
subject to

qωij − rij + sij ≤ Capωij , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
qωij+1 − qωij ≤ qUi , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T − 1
qωij − qωij+1 ≤ −qLi , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T − 1
qωij − qij − uωij + vωij = 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
qij , rij , sij ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , T
qωij , u
ω
ij , v
ω
ij ≥ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
rij ≤ 0, if i ∈ N cw, j = 1, . . . , T
sij ≤ 0, if i ∈ N c, j = 1, . . . , T

, i = 1, . . . , N
(2.13)

N∑
i=1
qωij = d
ω
j , (ρ
ωpωj ) ∀ω ∈ Ω∑
i∈N cw
sij =
∑
i∈Nw
rij , (p
r
j)∑
i∈N cw
sij ≤ η
∑
i∈N cw
Capωij , (ρ
ωζωj ) ∀ω ∈ Ω
N∑
i=1
qωij ≥ β
N∑
i=1
qij , (ρ
ωγωj ) ∀ω ∈ Ω

, j = 1, . . . , T.
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2.2 Imperfectly competitive Nash-Cournot models
In this subsection, we consider an imperfectly competitive regime wherein the prices of energy
are determined by an inverse demand function. As a consequence, demand is endogenously
defined and consequently, the real-time price in period j and scenario ω is given by pωj (Q
ω
j )
which is defined as
pωj (Q
ω
j ) , aωj − bωjQωj . (2.14)
Therefore, the resulting firm’s optimization problem is given by
(NCFirmi(p
r)) max piij(rij , sij , qij , q
ω
ij , u
ω
ij , v
ω
ij)
subject to
qωij − rij + sij ≤ Capωij , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
qωij+1 − qωij ≤ qUi , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T − 1
qωij − qωij+1 ≤ −qLi , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T − 1
qωij − qij − uωij + vωij = 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T∑
i∈N cw
sij ≤ η
∑
i∈N cw
Capωij , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
N∑
i=1
qωij ≥ β
N∑
i=1
qij ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
qij , rij , sij ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , T
qωij , u
ω
ij , v
ω
ij ≥ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
rij ≤ 0, if i ∈ N cw, j = 1, . . . , T
sij ≤ 0, if i ∈ Nw, j = 1, . . . , T
(2.15)
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where piij is defined as
piij(rij , sij , qij , q
ω
ij , u
ω
ij , v
ω
ij) ,
T∑
j=1
prj (sij − rij) (Reserves revenue)
+
T∑
j=1
E
[
pωj (Q
ω
j )q
ω
ij − cωij(qωi )
]
(Generation revenue-cost)
−
T∑
j=1
κij
(
φij(qij − rij + sij ; Capωij)
)
(Risk of shortfall), (2.16)
−
T−1∑
j=1
E[ξωij(q
ω
ij+1 − qωij)] (Cost of ramping)
−
T∑
j=1
E[δωij(u
ω
ij − vωij)]. (Cost of deviation).
The constrained stochastic Nash-Cournot equilibrium problem is given by the following:
(SNCE)
(rij, sij, qij, q
ω
ij, u
ω
ij, v
ω
ij) solves (NCFirmi(p
r
j)), j = 1, . . . , T
∑
i∈N cw
sij =
∑
i∈Nw
rij, (p
r
j) j = 1, . . . , T
(2.17)
In Section 3.2, we will present an equivalence result between (SNCE) and (SNCOPT),
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a stochastic convex optimization problem defined next.
(SNCOPT) min
N∑
i=1
T∑
j=1
E
[
1
2(q
ω
ij)
TMωq
ω
ij + δ
ω
ij(u
ω
ij − vωij) + (cωij(qωij)− aωj qωij)
]
+
N∑
i=1
T∑
j=1
[
κijφij(qij + rij − sij ; Capωij)
]
+
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
j=1
E
[
ξωij(q
ω
ij+1 − qωij)
]
subject to

qωij − rij + sij ≤ Capωij , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
qωij+1 − qωij ≤ qUi , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T − 1
qωij − qωij+1 ≤ −qLi , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T − 1
qωij − qij − uωij + vωij = 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
qij , rij , sij ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , T
qωij , u
ω
ij , v
ω
ij ≥ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
rij ≤ 0, if i ∈ N cw, j = 1, . . . , T
sij ≤ 0, if i ∈ N c, j = 1, . . . , T

, i = 1, . . . , N
(2.18)

∑
i∈N cw
sij =
∑
i∈Nw
rij , (p
r
j)∑
i∈N cw
sij ≤ η
∑
i∈N cw
Capωij , (ρ
ωζωj ) ∀ω ∈ Ω
N∑
i=1
qωij ≥ β
N∑
i=1
qij , (ρ
ωγωj ) ∀ω ∈ Ω

, j = 1, . . . , T.
where Mω , bω(I + eeT ) for all ω ∈ Ω.
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS
In Section 3.1, we provide sufficiency conditions for the existence of an equilibrium to the
perfectly competitive equilibrium problem. Similarly, Section 3.2 shows the existence result
for the imperfectly competitive Nash-Cournot problem.
3.1 Stochastic perfectly competitive equilibrium problem
To derive an existence result for the perfectly competitive equilibrium problem, we start by
making the following assumption on demand, capacity, ramping rates, and the convexity of
the cost of generation and ramping:
Assumption 1
(i) dωj ≤
∑N
i=1 Cap
ω
ij, ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T ;
(ii) dωj+1 − dωj ≤
∑N
i=1 q
U
i . ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T − 1;
(iii) dωj − dωj+1 ≤ −
∑N
i=1 q
L
i . ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T − 1
(iv) Both cωij and ξ
ω
ij are convex and increasing in their arguments for all
ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T, (j = 1, . . . , T − 1 for a ramping cost function) .
The first assumption requires that the demand in each period under each scenario must
be less than or equal to the total availability. The second (third) assumption states that
the demand in the next (current) period can be no greater (lower) than the demand in the
current (next) period plus(less) the sum of all upper (lower) ramping bounds. Lastly, we
assume that both a generation cost function cωij and a ramping cost function ξ
ω
ij are convex
and increasing in their arguments. We will use this assumption when deriving the solvability
of the optimization problem.
Lemma 1 Consider a convex function f(x). Then, max (f(x), 0) is also a convex function.
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Proof. Omitted.
The convexity of the risk measure φij is given by the following corollary found in Rockafellar
and Uryasev’s work [RU02, Corollary 11].
Corollary 1 [RU02, Cor. 11] Consider a risk measure defined as follows:
φ(x) , min
m
F (x,m), where F (x,m) , m+ 1
1− τ E[f(x;ω)−m]
+,
where τ ∈ (0, 1) and f(x;ω) is a loss function. If f(x;ω) is convex in x in an almost sure
sense, then φ(x) is also convex in x. It also follows that F (x,m) is jointly convex in (x,m).
Lemma 2 Consider a function fij(qij, rij, sij) , χij(hij(qij, rij, sij))+, where hij is a loss
function defined as hij(qij, rij, sij) , qij−rij+sij−Capωij. Then, Fij(qij, rij, sij,mij), which is
defined in (2.7), is convex in (qij, rij, sij,mij) when fij(qij, rij, sij) is convex in its arguments.
Proof. Since hij(qij, rij, sij) is linear in (qij, rij, sij), hij(qij, rij, sij) is convex in its argu-
ments. Then, it follows from Lemma 1 that max(hij(qij, rij, sij), 0) is convex. By the con-
vexity of fij(qij, rij, sij) in its arguments and by Corollary 1, Fij(qij, rij, sij,mij) is convex in
(qij, rij, sij,mij).
We now use the above results to show the convexity of the objective function of (SP-
COPT) by proving the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1(iv) holds. Then, for i = 1, . . . , N , the objective
function of (PCFirm) is convex in its arguments.
Proof. The objective function piij(rij, sij, qij, q
ω
ij) defined in (2.8) is the sum of a revenue
function, generation and ramping cost functions, and the risk measure. It suffices to show
that each function in the objective function is convex because the sum of convex functions is
also convex. By Assumption 1(iv), generation and ramping cost functions are convex while
the linear revenue function is trivially convex. It remains to show that a CVaR-based risk
measure given by φij(qij − rij + sij; Capωij) is convex. Then, the convexity of φij follows from
Corollary 1 when Fij(qij, rij, sij,mij) is convex in (qij, rij, sij,mij). But this holds by the
application of Lemma 2.
Next, we proceed to prove the equivalence relation between (SPCE) and (SPCOPT)
given by the following proposition:
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Proposition 2 Consider the problem (SPCE) and (SPCOPT).
Then, (rij, sij, qij, q
ω
ij, u
ω
ij, v
ω
ij) is a solution to (SPCE) if and only if (rij, sij, qij, q
ω
ij, u
ω
ij, v
ω
ij) is
a solution to (SPCOPT).
Proof. It follows from the convexity of the objectives of each agent’s problem and poly-
hedrality of the constraint sets that equilibrium conditions of (SPCE) are necessary and
sufficient. Then, the equilibrium conditions of (SPCE) based on the above firm’s problem
are given by the following.
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
0 ≤ rij ⊥ prj −
∑
ω∈Ω
ρωj (λ
ω
ij + χijψ
ω
ij) ≥ 0
0 ≤ sij ⊥ −prj +
∑
ω∈Ω
ρωj (λ
ω
ij + ζ
ω
ij + χijψ
ω
ij) ≥ 0
0 ≤ qij ⊥
∑
ω∈Ω
χijρ
ω
j ψ
ω
ij +
∑
ω∈Ω
ρωj (βγ
ω
j + σ
ω
ij) ≥ 0
free mij ⊥ κij −
∑
ω∈Ω
ρωj θ
ω
ij = 0

, ∀i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . , T (3.1)

0 ≤ qωij ⊥ −pωj + cω
′
ij + ξ
ω′
ij + λ
ω
ij − µωij + νωij − γωj − σωij ≥ 0
0 ≤ uωij ⊥ σωij ≥ 0
0 ≤ vωij ⊥ −σωij ≥ 0
0 ≤ wωij ⊥ θωij − ψωij ≥ 0
0 ≤ αωij ⊥
(
κij
1− τij
)
− θωij ≥ 0
0 ≤ λωij ⊥ Capωij − qωij + rij − sij ≥ 0
0 ≤ θωij ⊥ αωij−wωij +mij ≥ 0
0 ≤ ψωij ⊥ wωij − χij(sij − rij + qij − Capωij) ≥ 0
0 ≤ µωij ⊥ qUij − qωij+1 + qωij ≥ 0
0 ≤ νωij ⊥ −qLij + qωij+1 − qωij ≥ 0

, ∀i = 1, . . . , N, ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
(3.2)
0 ≤ γωj ⊥
N∑
i=1
qωij − β
N∑
i=1
qij ≥ 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
0 ≤ ζωj ⊥ η
∑
i∈N cw
Capωij −
∑
i∈N cw
sij ≥ 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T (3.3)
free pωj ⊥
∑
i∈N
qωij −Dωj = 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
free prj ⊥
∑
i∈N cw
sij −
∑
i∈Nw
rij = 0 j = 1, . . . , T.
However, these conditions can be seen to be the optimality conditions of the optimization
problem defined by (SPCOPT). But (SPCOPT) is a convex optimization problem, which
is a consequence of the polyhedrality of the feasible space and convexity of its objective.
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Given that the optimization problem is convex, we may proceed to show the solvability of
(SPCOPT) as follows. We begin with a statement pertaining to the nature of the polyhedral
feasible region, given by Γpc, and defined as follows:
Γpc ,

(r, s, q, qω, uω, vω) | • qωij − rij + sij ≤ Capωij , ∀ω ∈ Ω, i = 1, . . . , N (∗)
• qωij+1 − qωij ≤ qUi , ∀ω ∈ Ω, i = 1, . . . , N
• qωij − qωij+1 ≤ −qLi , ∀ω ∈ Ω, i = 1, . . . , N
• qωij − qij − uωij + vωij = 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, i = 1, . . . , N
•
N∑
i=1
qωij ≥ β
N∑
i=1
qij , ∀ω ∈ Ω
•
∑
i∈N cw
sij ≤ η
∑
i∈N cw
Capωij , ∀ω ∈ Ω
• rij , sij ≥ 0, ∀ i = 1, . . . , N
• qωij ≥ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, i = 1, . . . , N
• rij ≤ 0, if i ∈ N cw
• sij ≤ 0, if i ∈ Nw
•
N∑
i=1
qωij = d
ω
j , ∀ω ∈ Ω
•
∑
i∈N cw
sij =
∑
i∈Nw
rij .

, j = 1, . . . , T
(3.4)
Lemma 3 Consider the stochastic perfectly competitive equilibrium model given by (SPCE).
Suppose Assumption 1(i)− (iv) holds. Then the following holds:
z ∈ Γpc, ‖z‖ → +∞
=⇒ ‖uω + vω‖ → +∞,
N∑
i=1
(uωij − vωij) ≤
(
1− 1
β
) N∑
i=1
Capωij for every ω ∈ Ω and j ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
Proof. We begin by showing that Γpc is bounded with respect to the variables r, s, q, and
qω.
1. [Boundedness of sij] : Boundedness of sij is a direct consequence of the constraint∑
i∈N cw
sij ≤ η
∑
i∈N cw
Capωij, ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T.
Since
∑
i∈N cw sij is bounded for j = 1, . . . , T and ω ∈ Ω, each sij is also bounded for
i = 1, . . . , N and j = 1, . . . , T by noting that sωij ≥ 0 for all i, j, ω and sωij = 0 for
i ∈ Nw and for all j, ω.
21
2. [Boundedness of rij] : Note that
∑
i∈N cw sij =
∑
i∈Nw rij for all j = 1, . . . , T , which
implies that
∑
i∈Nw rij is bounded as well. By nonnegativity and by noting that rij = 0
for i ∈ N cw and j = 1, . . . , T , rij is bounded for all i = 1, . . . , N and j = 1, . . . , T .
3.
[
Boundedness of qωij
]
: By doing a summation of (∗) in (3.4) over all i = 1, . . . , N ,
we obtain the following for j = 1, . . . , T and ω ∈ Ω
N∑
i=1
qωij ≤
N∑
i=1
Capωij +
∑
i∈Nw
rij +
∑
i∈N cw
rij −
∑
i∈Nw
sij −
∑
i∈N cw
sij
=
N∑
i=1
Capωij,
where
∑
i∈N cw rij and
∑
i∈Nw sij in the first inequality are simply zero as non-wind firms
are not allowed to buy reserves while wind firms are not allowed to sell reserves. Since∑N
i=1 q
ω
ij is bounded for j = 1, . . . , T and ω ∈ Ω, qωij is also bounded by nonnegativity
for i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , T and ω ∈ Ω.
4. [Boundedness of qij] : Similarly,
∑N
i=1 qij is bounded due to the constraint
∑N
i=1 q
ω
ij ≥
β
∑N
i=1 qij, for all ω ∈ Ω and j = 1, . . . , T . By nonnegativity of each component, qij is
also bounded.
Having shown the boundedness with respect to r, s, q, and qω, we proceed to examine the
requirements on uω and vω. Recall that for i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , T and ω ∈ Ω, qωij −
qij − uωij + vωij = 0. By doing a summation over all i = 1, . . . , N , we obtain the following for
j = 1, . . . , T and ω ∈ Ω:
N∑
i=1
qωij −
N∑
i=1
qij =
N∑
i=1
uωij −
N∑
i=1
vωij. (3.5)
However, by recalling that
∑N
i=1 q
ω
ij ≥ β
∑N
i=1 qij,∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T , we have the following
upper bound:
(
1− 1
β
) N∑
i=1
Capωij ≥
(
1− 1
β
) N∑
i=1
qωij ≥
N∑
i=1
qωij −
N∑
i=1
qij.
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By invoking (3.5), we obtain the following:
(
1− 1
β
) N∑
i=1
Capωij ≥
N∑
i=1
(uωij − vωij), ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T. (3.6)
It follows that if z ∈ Γpc and ‖z‖ → ∞, by the boundedness of r, s, q, and qω, we have that
0 ≤ ‖uω + vω‖ → ∞. Finally, by the feasibility requirements, we have that (3.6) needs to be
satisfied and the result follows.
Having established an understanding of Γpc, we proceed to show the solvability of (SP-
COPT) by showing a suitable coercivity property holds.
Proposition 3 Consider the stochastic perfectly competitive equilibrium model given by
(SPCE). Suppose Assumption 1(i)− (iv) holds. Then, (SPCOPT) admits a solution and
therefore, (SPCE) admits an equilibrium.
Nonemptiness of Γpc: We begin by showing that there exists a vector zref ∈ Γpc. Choose
rij = sij = qij = 0 for all i, j. Then, we may always find feasible q
ω
ij for all i = 1, . . . , N ,
j = 1, . . . , T and ω ∈ Ω as long as the solution satisfies the following:
N∑
i=1
qωij = d
ω
j ≤
N∑
i=1
Capωij, ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T (3.7)
N∑
i=1
qωij+1 −
N∑
i=1
qωij = d
ω
j+1 − dωj ≤
N∑
i=1
qUi , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T − 1 (3.8)
N∑
i=1
qωij −
N∑
i=1
qωij+1 = d
ω
j − dωj+1 ≤ −
N∑
i=1
qLi , ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T − 1 (3.9)
N∑
i=1
qωij ≥ β
N∑
i=1
qij = 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T. (3.10)
where (3.7) follows from Assumption 1(i). Moreover, both (3.8) and (3.9) are from ramping
constraints which must be satisfied by Assumption 1(ii) and 1(iii). Lastly, (3.10) follows
from the nonnegativity of qωij. Note that u
ω
ij = q
ω
ij and v
ω
ij for all i, j, ω.
Solvability of (SPCOPT) follows from verifying that a suitable coercivity condition holds
(see [FP03, Ch. 2]); more specifically, (SPCOPT) is solvable if there exists a feasible vector
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zref ∈ Γpc such that
lim inf
‖z‖→∞,z∈Γpc
∇zpi(z)T (zref − z) =∞. (3.11)
But recalling the choice of zref from Lemma 3 and that all of the variables are bounded,
except uω and vω, the expression on the left in (3.11) can be represented and simplified as
follows:
lim inf
‖z‖→∞,z∈Γpc
∇zpi(z)T (zref − z) = lim inf‖uω+vω‖→∞,uω ,vω≥0
∑
i,j,ω
[
∇uωijpi(z)(u
ω,ref
ij − uωij) +∇vωijpi(z)(−vωij)
]
= lim inf
‖uω+vω‖→∞,uω ,vω≥0
∑
i,j,ω
ρω
[
uω,refij g
ω
ij(u
ω
ij − vωij) + gωij(uωij − vωij)2
]
,
where vω,refij = 0 for every i, j, ω. Finally, from observing that for at least for some i, j, ω,
we have that uωij, v
ω
ij → +∞, and the quadratic term grows at a faster rate than the linear
term, the limit infimum can be seen to be +∞:
lim inf
‖uω+vω‖→∞,uω ,vω≥0
∑
i,j,ω
ρω
[
uω,refij g
ω
ij(u
ω
ij − vωij) + gωij(uωij − vωij)2
]
=∞,
As a consequence, (SPCOPT) admits a solution and (SPCE) admits an equilibrium.
3.2 Stochastic Nash-Cournot equilibrium problem
In this section, we now provide a sufficiency condition for the existence of an equilibrium to
the Nash-Cournot equilibrium problem. Unlike the perfectly competitive equilibrium case,
we will only utilize Assumption 1(ii),(iii), and (iv) as the demand is endogenously defined.
We proceed to show the convexity of the objective function of (SNCE) by proving the
following proposition:
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1(iv) holds. Then, the objective function of (NC-
Firm) is convex in its arguments.
Proof. The objective function piij(rij, sij, qij, q
ω
ij) defined in (2.16) is the sum of a linear
revenue function, a generation revenue function, generation and ramping cost functions, and
the risk measure. We omit the proof of showing the convexity of the risk measure (see Propo-
sition ??). Finally, the convexity of cost functions are given by Assumption 1(iv) while the
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linear functions are trivially convex. Thus, it suffices to show the concavity of the genera-
tion revenue function given by pωj (Q
ω
j )q
ω
ij. Recall from Section 2.2 that we can express the
generation revenue function as
1
2
(qωij)
TMωq
ω
ij−aωijqωij = −pωj (Qωj )qωij, where Mω , bω(I+eeT ),
aωijq
ω
ij is a linear function, and Mω is a positive definite matrix. Hence, the corresponding
quadratic function is strongly convex and the overall objective is convex.
Next, we proceed to derive an equivalence between the constrained stochastic Nash-
Cournot problem and a single stochastic convex optimziation problem. Before providing
a formal result, we consider a simple N -person static Nash-Cournot game. In such a game,
firm i’s optimization problem is given by
min
qi≥0
(ciqi − p(Q)qi),
where p(Q) , a − bQ. Then, it follows that under convexity assumptions on ci(.) for all i,
the (sufficient) first-order conditions are given by
0 ≤ qi ⊥ 2bqi + b
∑
j 6=i
qj + ci − a ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N.
More compactly, these conditions are captured by the linear complementarity problem
LCP(d,M) where
M , b(I + eeT ), d , c− ae,
I denotes the identity matrix and e represents the column of ones. It follows by the symmetry
ofM that these conditions represent the optimality conditions of a convex quadratic program:
min
q≥0
(
1
2
qTMq + dT q
)
.
Next, we proceed to prove the equivalence relation between (SNCE) and (SNCOPT)
given by the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Consider the problem (SNCE) and (SNCOPT).
Then, (rij, sij, qij, q
ω
ij, u
ω
ij, v
ω
ij) is a solution to (SNCE) if and only if (rij, sij, qij, q
ω
ij, u
ω
ij, v
ω
ij)
is a solution to (SNCOPT).
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By the convexity of each firm’s problem, the necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions
of (SNCE) are given by the following:
0 ≤ rij ⊥ prj −
∑
ω∈Ω
ρωj (λ
ω
ij + χijψ
ω
ij) ≥ 0
0 ≤ sij ⊥ −prj +
∑
ω∈Ω
ρωj (λ
ω
ij + ζ
ω
ij + χijψ
ω
ij) ≥ 0
0 ≤ qij ⊥
∑
ω∈Ω
χijρ
ω
j ψ
ω
ij +
∑
ω∈Ω
ρωj (βγ
ω
j + σ
ω
ij) ≥ 0
free mij ⊥ κij −
∑
ω∈Ω
ρωj θ
ω
ij = 0

, ∀i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . , T (3.12)

0 ≤ qωij ⊥ cω
′
ij − aωj +Mωqωij + ξω
′
ij + λ
ω
ij − µωij + νωij − γωj − σωij ≥ 0
0 ≤ uωij ⊥ σωij ≥ 0
0 ≤ vωij ⊥ −σωij ≥ 0
0 ≤ wωij ⊥ θωij − ψωij ≥ 0
0 ≤ αωij ⊥
(
κij
1− τij
)
− θωij ≥ 0
0 ≤ λωij ⊥ Capωij − qωij + rij − sij ≥ 0
0 ≤ θωij ⊥ αωij−wωij +mij ≥ 0
0 ≤ ψωij ⊥ wωij − χij(sij − rij + qij − Capωij) ≥ 0
0 ≤ µωij ⊥ qUij − qωij+1 + qωij ≥ 0
0 ≤ νωij ⊥ −qLij + qωij+1 − qωij ≥ 0

,∀i = 1, . . . , N, ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
(3.13)
0 ≤ γωj ⊥
N∑
i=1
qωij − β
N∑
i=1
qij ≥ 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T
0 ≤ ζωj ⊥ η
∑
i∈N cw
Capωij −
∑
i∈N cw
sij ≥ 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω, j = 1, . . . , T (3.14)
free prj ⊥
∑
i∈N cw
sij −
∑
i∈Nw
rij = 0 j = 1, . . . , T.
However, these conditions can be seen to be the optimality conditions of (SNCOPT).
But (SNCOPT) is a convex optimization problem and these conditions are necessary and
sufficient.
The solvability of (SNCOPT) follows in a fashion similar to that seen in examining
(SPCOPT), with the key distinction that demand is no longer exogenous. We omit this
proof for purposes of brevity.
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Proposition 6 Consider the stochastic Nash-Cournot equilibrium model given by (SNCE).
Suppose Assumption 1(iv) holds. Then, (SNCOPT) admits a solution and therefore,
(SNCE) admits an equilibrium.
Proof: Omitted.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
In this chapter, we employ the proposed model to study the impact of risk-based penalties
and the availability of reserves on the bidding strategy of generating firms with uncertain
assets. In Section 4.1, we describe the set of parameters to be used for the base case in our
numerical analysis. In Section 4.2, we study the effect of the availability of reserves on the
bidding strategy of firms and the grid reliability. We discuss the changes in reserves and
expected energy prices as well as the reserve price premium from varying ramping rates in
Section 4.3. Finally, in Section 4.4, we examine the changes in prices and bidding strategy
of wind firms as the volatility of wind power increases.
4.1 Description of Model
We consider a single-node model with T = 24 periods and |Ω| = 20 scenarios for the stochastic
perfectly competitive equilibrium and |Ω| = 10 for the stochastic Nash-Cournot equilibrium.
We now define a set of parameters to be used in a base case for each problem.
Base case for SPCE: Table 4.1 shows the generation costs for all six firms. Here, we
assume deterministic generation costs for all six firms. Notice that firms 5 and 6 have
relatively lower generation costs indicating that a greater amount of windpower is utilized
in their generation mix.
Table 4.1: Generation costs (SPCE)
Firm Quadratic cost Linear cost Deviation cost Ramping cost
1 10 10 1 1
2 10 10 1 1
3 20 10 1 1
4 20 10 1 1
5 2 0 1 1
6 2 0 1 1
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Moreover, the upper and lower ramping bounds are set to 70 and -70, respectively. The
demand is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 800 and a standard deviation
of 50. The value of β in (2.12) is 0.3 while the value of η in (2.11) is 0.4. Finally, the set of
parameters associated with the risk measure is described in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Parameters for the risk measure (SPCE)
κ 1
τ 0.9
χ 1
Base case for SNCE: Similarly, Table 4.3 shows generation costs for all six firms for
the Nash-Cournot equilibrium problem. Again, we assume fixed generation costs for all six
firms. Firms 5 and 6 are assumed to be wind firms with relatively lower generation costs.
Table 4.3: Generation costs (SNCE)
Firm Quadratic cost Linear cost Deviation cost Ramping cost
1 0.01 10 1 1
2 0.01 10 1 1
3 0.02 10 1 1
4 0.02 10 1 1
5 0.002 0 1 1
6 0.002 0 1 1
Moreover, the upper and lower ramping bounds are set at 40 and -40, respectively. The
value of β and η are defined as 0.3 and 0.1, respectively. Table 4.4 specifies the parameters
associated with the risk measure. Lastly, the price intercept for the affine price function is
assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 6250000 and a standard deviation of
1000. The slope of the price function is assumed to be deterministic and set at 0.6 for all
periods and scenarios.
Table 4.4: Parameters for the risk measure (SNCE)
κ 0.01
τ 0.9
χ 0.01
Capacity distribution: Both the perfectly competitive and the Nash equilibrium prob-
lems use the same wind capacity distribution which are constructed from the NREL data
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Table 4.5: Capacity of wind firms
Site1 Site2
Sites Capacity (MW) Sites Capacity (MW)
2463 101.5 2945 126
2885 108.8 5262 100.3
5106 111.2
Total 321 MW Total 226 MW
Figure 4.1: Wind capacity at site 1
set. As given in Table 4.5, these two sites are compiled from 5 sites in New Hampshire, all
within 30 square miles. The resulting nominal capacities of site 1 and 2 after generating a
set of wind trajectories are given in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, respectively. Both figures
show the volatile nature of the wind supply which varies throughout the day. The capacities
for non-wind firms are assumed to be fixed at 270 for the stochastic perfectly competitive
equilibrium problem and 100 for the stochastic Nash-Cournot equilibrium problem.
Collectively, we refer to this set of parameters as the base case. In the remainder of this
section, we derive a range of insights drawn from conducting sensitivity analysis on varying
parameters from the base case.
4.2 Availability of reserves
In this section, we look at the impact of availability of reserves on the bidding strategy of
firms with volatile assets and the grid reliability. We consider the following two cases: the
first case where firms have access to the reserves market and the second case where firms
have no access to the reserves market.
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Figure 4.2: Wind capacity at site 2
Figure 4.3: Bidding behavior of wind firm 5 (SPCE)
Impact on bidding behavior: We first examine if firms with volatile assets package their
bids with reserves bids when reserves are available. We choose firm 5, which is wind based,
to see if it combines generation bids with reserves bids as we introduce reserves in the day-
ahead market.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show that firms with volatile assets do indeed package their bids with
stable reserve assets. By observing firm 5’s bidding behavior shown in both figures, we ob-
tain three important findings regarding wind firms’ bidding strategy with the presence of risk.
First, we can see from Figure 4.4 that firm 5 begins to buy reserves when its expected
capacity falls in the later periods. This clearly shows that wind firms adapt packaging
bids as an optimal bidding strategy to mitigate the risk of shortfall in the real-time mar-
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Figure 4.4: Bidding behavior of wind firm 5 (SNCE)
ket. To examine the notion of reducing the risk of shortfall through packaging bids, we
will conduct a more in-depth analysis later in this section to verify if individual wind firm’s
effort of avoiding the risk-based penalty may impact overall grid reliability. This may allow
for further substantiating the effectiveness of having a risk measure in future market designs.
Second, the level of expected wind generation becomes higher when reserves are introduced
in the day-ahead market. We revisit this shortly when conducting sensitivity analysis on the
impact of availability of reserves on expected wind participation to determine if the overall
expected wind participation improves with the introduction of reserves in the day-ahead
market.
Lastly, wind firms’ expected generation becomes more stable when they have access to re-
serves in the day-ahead market. Since reserve purchases augment the expected wind capacity,
which then can be utilized in real-time generation in case of shortfall in wind capacities. This
is indeed true for the case of wind firm 5 as we see from Figures 4.3 and 4.4 that firm 5
utilizes most of its reserve purchase in its real-time generation in the later periods where we
see a significant drop in the expected wind availability. This ensures a stable wind generation
in the real-time market under the potential risk of shortfall. In the subsequent analysis, we
will verify this numerically by measuring the volatility of expected aggregate wind output.
Impact on volatility of real-time generation: In our previous discussion, we verified
that wind firms package their bids with reserve bids. We now use the coefficient of variation
to determine if combining energy bids with reserve bids could reduce the volatility in the
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Figure 4.5: Coefficient of variation for expected aggregate wind output (SPCE)
expected aggregate wind generation. The coefficient of variation measures the variability in
the real-time generation, which is given by
cv =
σ
µ
, (4.1)
where σ is the standard deviation and µ is the mean of the sample. The smaller the variance
in generation capacity, the lower the coefficient of variation. By computing the expected
aggregate wind output and its standard deviation, we can compare the volatility of the
expected aggregate wind generation with and without reserves available. Figures 4.5 and 4.6
show a significant reduction in the coefficient of variation for the expected aggregate wind
output when reserves become available, especially between periods 15 and 24, where the risk
of shortfall is the greatest. We can relate this result to our previous findings on the risk-averse
bidding behavior of wind firms. As we mentioned earlier, wind firms increase their real-time
capacities by buying more reserves in the day-ahead market in order to mitigate the risk of
shortfall in the real-time market. Once the risk of shortfall is reduced, the corresponding
wind generation in the real-time market will also be less volatile as the volatility of aggregate
wind firm output is reduced.
Impact on expected wind participation: Renewable portfolio standards mandate that
markets should have a preserved amount of renewables. The allowance for packaging reserves
can be seen to augment participation of wind firms. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the expected
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Figure 4.6: Coefficient of variation for expected aggregate wind output (SNCE)
aggregate real-time wind generation across each period with and without reserves available.
It is evident from both figures that allowing firms to bid in the reserves market results
in a growth of wind firms’ participation in the real-time market. This result is desirable
considering packaging reserves bids when wind firms are facing with the risk of shortfall. The
addition of these reserves bids to their expected capacities can be utilized in the real-time
market in case of actual shortfall. On the other hand, wind firms with no reserves available
in the day-ahead market will simply reduce their real-time generation by the amount of
shortfall. Collectively, packaging reserves results in an increase in the expected aggregate
wind output.
Impact on grid reliability: As discussed earlier, the impact of availability of reserves on
grid reliability is measured by CVaR, which indicates a degree of underlying risk of shortfall
in the real-time market. A lower CVaR implies higher reliability from the standpoint of
availability. Both Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show that the CVaR decreases as reserves become
available. In other words, the overall reliability improves with the availability of reserves.
This result can be explained by the previous findings that wind firms package their bids
with reserves bids when the risk penalty is introduced. As a consequence of buying more
reserves, we see a decrease in the risk of shortfall and therefore, a decrease in the overall
CVaR. Hence, packaging energy bids with reserves bids improves the overall reliability of the
market.
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Figure 4.7: Expected wind participation with and without availability of reserves (SPCE)
Figure 4.8: Expected wind participation with and without availability of reserves (SNCE)
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Figure 4.9: Comparison of CVaR with and without availability of reserves (SPCE)
Figure 4.10: Comparison of CVaR with and without availability of reserves (SNCE)
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Figure 4.11: E[prj − pωj ] vs. η (SPCE)
Impact on reserve price premium: Previously, we observe that the introduction of
reserves bids improves the grid reliability. We now conduct a sensitivity analysis on the
reserve price premium with each increment of the availability of reserves, where the reserve
price premium is given by E[prj − pωj ]. We use η in (2.11) to vary the upper bound on
the total reserves supply. We anticipate that the reserve price premium may decrease as the
availability of reserves in the day-ahead market increases. In fact, both Figures 4.11 and 4.12
show that as we introduce more reserves to the market, the reserve price premium decreases.
4.3 Restriction on ramping
In this section, we study the effect of changing ramping rates on the reserve and energy price,
as well as on the reserve price premium in the stochastic perfectly competitive equilibrium
problem. We use the following two ramping rates in the subsequent analysis: the base
ramping rates (±70) and the tight ramping rates (±35). Noting that the tight ramping
rates are carefully chosen to still satisfy the demand constraint while these ramping rates
are tight enough to observe its full effect.
Impact on price trajectories: We study the impact of varying ramping rates on both
energy and reserve prices. Figure 4.13 shows the price trajectories for the base case where the
upper and lower ramping rates are 70 and -70, respectively. On the other hand, Figure 4.14
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Figure 4.12: E[prj − pωj ] vs. η (SNCE)
Figure 4.13: Expected energy and reserve prices when ramping rates are ±70 (SPCE)
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Figure 4.14: Expected energy and reserve prices when ramping rates are ±35 (SPCE)
shows the price trajectories when the upper and lower ramping rates are tightened to 20
and -20, respectively. We can see from these two figures that the reserves price has more
peaks as we tighten the ramping rates. However, in such a co-optimized model, it is also
apparent that ramping rates do not appear to affect the expected energy price, but impact
the reserves price. An increase number of reserves price peaks can be better explained by
taking a closer examination on the reserves price trajectories. If we look at the changes
in the reserves price from period 15 to period 16 in Figure 4.13, we see an increase in the
reserves price. This implies that the demand for reserves has increased from period 15 to
16. However, Figure 4.14 shows that there is a fall in the reserves price from period 15
to 16, implying that the demand for reserves has actually decreased. In the case of base
ramping rates, firms are able to ramp up their generation quickly such that more reserves
are required to reduce the risk of shortfall compared to the amount of reserves purchase in
the previous period. On the other hand, in the case of tight ramping rates, firms cannot
ramp up their generation quickly enough such that less reserves are required to mitigate the
risk relative to the previous period. Notice that this is just a single instance from two periods
that we picked; other outcomes are also possible depending on the real-time demand and
wind availabilities in each period, thus explaining the spiky behavior of the reserves price.
Impact on reserve price premium: We now conduct a sensitivity analysis on the reserve
price premium for varying ramping rates. Figure 4.15 shows that the reserve price premium
decreases as ramping rates are less strictly imposed. From our previous analysis on the price
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Figure 4.15: E[prj − pωj ] vs. ramping rate (SPCE)
sensitivity associated with ramping rates, we noticed that the fluctuation of reserves price
increases with tighter ramping rates. Therefore, firms get charged with less reserve price
premium as the reserves price becomes more stable for each increment of ramping rates.
4.4 Volatility of wind capacity
In this section, we study the impact of increasing volatility of wind power on energy and
reserves pricing, the bidding behavior, and the reserve price premium. In subsequent analysis,
we increase the standard deviation of wind capacity by a factor of σ, where σ increases from
0 to 2 with steps of 0.2.
Impact on reserve price: We perform a sensitivity analysis on the reserves price for
an increasing volatility of wind power. Both Figures 4.16 and 4.17 show an increase in
the reserves price as the volatility of wind power increases. Given the perfectly competitive
reserves market, an increase in the reserves price shown in both figures may imply an increase
in the demand for reserves. Hence, in the next analysis, we will verify that an increase in the
reserves price associated with an increase in the wind volatility is a result of a corresponding
increase in the reserves purchase.
Impact on reserves to expected generation ratio: From our previous discussion,
we notice that the volatility of wind power affects the reserves price. Since the reserves
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Figure 4.16: Impact of increasing volatility of wind power on reserve prices (SPCE)
Figure 4.17: Impact of increasing volatility of wind power on reserve prices (SNCE)
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Figure 4.18: Impact of increasing volatility of wind power on reserve bids to expected output
ratio (SPCE)
price is sensitive to the changes in the demand and supply for reserves under the perfectly
competitive market assumption, we now study the impact of an increasing volatility of wind
power on wind firms’ real-time generation and reserves bidding decisions. The proportion of
reserves bids over the real-time generation is given by
1
T
∑T
j=1 rij
E[qωij]
. (4.2)
Also, we choose firm 5 to observe the changes in the proportion of reserves bids over its
expected generation. Figures 4.18 and 4.19 show that the reserves bids to the expected
generation ratio indeed increases as the variability of wind power increases. This result is
expected because the risk of shortfall increases with the increase in the volatility of wind
power. Recall that wind firms are charged the risk-based penalty associated with the risk
of shortfall in the real-time market. To mitigate such penalty, wind firms buy reserves to
increase their availabilities and therefore, reduce the chance of shortfall. Consequently, wind
firms will buy more reserves in response to an increase in the volatility of wind power. This
growing demand for reserves also provides an explanation for our previous observation on
an increasing reserves price with increasing variability of wind power.
Impact on the reserve price premium: We now plot the reserve price premium in
Figures 4.20 and 4.21 to study the sensitivity of the reserve price premium over the volatility
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Figure 4.19: Impact of increasing volatility of wind power on reserve bids to expected output
ratio (SNCE)
of wind availability. Both figures show that the reserve price premium increases when the
variability in wind capacity increases. This result implies that firms get charged with more
reserve price premium when there is a higher risk present associated with an increasing
volatility of wind power. Furthermore, such an increase in the reserve price premium will
provide sufficient economic incentives to make selling reserves an attractive option for non-
wind firms.
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Figure 4.20: Impact of increasing volatility of wind power on E[prj − pωj ] (SPCE)
Figure 4.21: Impact of increasing volatility of wind power on E[prj − pωj ] (SNCE)
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis presents a model for capturing strategic behavior in co-optimized energy-reserves
markets under uncertainty. The work is motivated by growing concerns on the grid reliability
due to an increasing integration of wind resources into the nation’s grid. Thus, a risk-
based penalty has been implemented where firms are charged based on the risk of shortfall
in the real-time market. Upon the construction of such a framework, we carried an in-
depth examination of stochastic variational problems. By showing coercivity properties,
we proved the existence of equilibria in the stochastic perfectly competitive model and its
imperfectly competitive Nash-Cournot counterpart. By allowing for access to reserves, we
observe that wind-based generating firms present packaged bids with volatile generation
and stable reserves. Numerical analysis also reveals that such packaging helps reduce the
effect of the volatility of wind power. Furthermore, a series of analysis on grid reliability
supports our claim that proposed market designs improve the grid reliability. In this thesis,
computation of equilibria has not been exclusively discussed. Given that these problems are
stochastic, obtaining the solution directly may be challenging for a large cardinality of sample
space. Hence, our future research will tend towards developing decomposition schemes in
such regimes.
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